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The Debate over Inclusive Fitness
as a Debate over MethodologiesHannah Rubin*y
This article analyzes the recent debate surrounding inclusive ﬁtness and argues that cer-
tain limitations ascribed to it by critics—such as requiring weak selection or providing
dynamically insufﬁcient models—are better thought of as limitations of the methodolog-
ical framework most often used with inclusive ﬁtness (quantitative genetics). In support
of this, I show how inclusive ﬁtness can be used with the replicator dynamics (of evo-
lutionary game theory, a methodological framework preferred by inclusive ﬁtness crit-
ics). I conclude that much of the debate is best understood as being about the orthogonal
issue of using abstract versus idealized models.1. Introduction. The mathematical framework of inclusive ﬁtness was
ﬁrst introduced by Hamilton (1963, 1964) in order to help explain the evo-
lution of social traits by kin selection and has helped to give new, intuitive
explanations of a variety of traits including altruism, eusociality, parental
care, and genomic imprinting (Grafen 1984; Marshall 2015, and references
therein). In calculating inclusive ﬁtness, one looks at the effects an organ-
ism has on other organisms’ reproductive success, rather than just looking
at the organism’s own reproductive success. These effects are then weighted
by the ‘relatedness’ of the organism to those organisms it affects.
In recent years, there has been an extensive debate surrounding inclusive
ﬁtness. Some authors argue that inclusive ﬁtness calculations can be wrong
(van Veelen 2009), while others argue that it requires stringent assumptions*To contact the author, please write to: Department of Theoretical Philosophy, Univer-
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All uand is less general than ‘standard’ natural selection (Nowak, Tarnita, andWil-
son 2010; Wilson 2012; Allen, Nowak, and Wilson 2013). The response is
that inclusive ﬁtness calculations are not (merely by virtue of using the math-
ematical framework) susceptible to being wrong (Marshall 2011) and do not
require stringent assumptions like weak selection (e.g., Abbot et al. 2011;
Marshall 2015), additive payoffs (e.g., Queller 1992; Taylor andMaciejewski
2012; Birch 2014b; Birch and Okasha 2015), pairwise interactions (e.g., Tay-
lor, Wild, and Gardner 2007; Abbot et al. 2011; Marshall 2011), or special
population structures (e.g., Taylor and Frank 1996; Taylor et al. 2007; Abbot
et al. 2011; Taylor and Maciejewski 2012; Marshall 2015).
Critics of inclusive ﬁtness often propose evolutionary game theory or pop-
ulation genetics as alternatives to the inclusive ﬁtness framework (Nowak
et al. 2010, 2011; Traulsen 2010; Allen et al. 2013; Allen and Nowak 2015).
Often, the comparisons are made between very simple models in quantitative
genetics, which abstract away from particular details of any given population,
andmore complexmodels arising out of population genetics,whichoften take
into accountmore of the particular details. Here,wewill look at how inclusive
ﬁtness can function in evolutionary game theory, which oftenmakes idealiza-
tions rather than abstractions inorder to achieve simplemodels.Thedifference
between these two modeling strategies (using abstractions vs. using idealiza-
tions)andhowthis relates to the inclusiveﬁtnessdebatewill bediscussedmore
in sections 3.3 and 5. Looking at theway inclusiveﬁtness can be incorporated
into evolutionary game theory will help show where some of the disagree-
ments about inclusive ﬁtness arise and when inclusive ﬁtness calculations
mightbeexpected tohave the limitationsascribed to thembycritics. Itwill also
demonstrate howwe can think of some parts of the debate as arising from dif-
ferent sides emphasizing different methodologies, rather than as disagree-
ments over inclusive ﬁtness as a way of calculating ﬁtness.
First, I introduce the framework of inclusive ﬁtness and compare it to
‘neighbor-modulated’ ﬁtness calculations in section 2. Then, in section 3, I
discuss the debate that has arisen around the inclusive ﬁtness framework, fo-
cusing on issues that can be understood as arising from the different sides of
the debate emphasizing different methodologies. In section 4, I discuss how
models using both neighbor-modulated and inclusive ﬁtness are connected
and provide a simple example to demonstrate these connections. Section 5
will provide a few ways to think about these connections and explain how
they canhelpusunderstand some issues in the inclusiveﬁtness debate. Finally,
section 6 concludes.2. Inclusive Fitness and Neighbor-Modulated Fitness
2.1. Basic Calculations. Inclusive ﬁtness and the related concept of
neighbor-modulated ﬁtness were ﬁrst proposed by Hamilton (1964).This content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on May 31, 2018 00:28:26 AM
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DEBATE OVER INCLUSIVE FITNESS 3Roughly, the neighbor-modulated ﬁtness of an organism is calculated by
adding up the number of offspring the organism is expected to have from
some social interaction of interest. Inclusive ﬁtness is an alternative math-
ematical framework in which ﬁtness calculations track the offspring caused
by a particular organism, rather than tracking the offspring an organism ac-
tually has. The offspring caused by the organism are then weighted accord-
ing to a ‘relatedness’ parameter, which is a measure of how likely it is that
the focal organism and its social partner share genetic material, relative to
the rest of the population. The two types of ﬁtness calculations provide al-
ternative ways of partitioning the causal structure of social interactions. A
more concrete description of the equations used in both frameworks will be
provided below.
The inclusive ﬁtness framework might initially seem counterintuitive, so
it is helpful to start with a basic observation: in general, a trait will increase
in frequency when organisms with that trait have more offspring than the
average organism in the population. To determine whether a trait of interest
will increase in frequency, we want to see how many offspring organisms
with that trait will have. Inclusive ﬁtness gives us this information by telling
us how many offspring are caused by an organism and how likely it is that
these offspring are had by an organism with the trait of interest.
We can calculate inclusive ﬁtness for a focal organism, i, by looking at
the effects from all its social interactions relevant to our trait of interest.
When i interacts with other organisms, it affects its own ﬁtness by some
amount (sii) and the ﬁtness of another organism, j, by some amount (sij).
The genotype of organism i also predicts, to a certain extent, the genotype
of the social partner j. This relationship is described by rij. There will be
more details on calculating rij in sections 2.2 and 4, but for now we can
think of it as a measure of how likely it is that i and j share genetic material.




This ﬁtness calculation gives us information about how the population will
evolve. It tells us how many offspring are had by organisms with the trait of
interest, and since offspring tend to be like their parents, this gives us infor-
mation about how the composition of a population is expected to change.
Note that, although it is sometimes described this way, inclusive ﬁtness is
not calculated by counting the number of offspring an organism has and
then adding all the offspring its relatives have (weighted by relatedness).
Compare the inclusive ﬁtness approach to the neighbor-modulated ﬁt-
ness approach, where we look at an organism, i, and add up the effects
of its social interactions on its own number of offspring. The neighbor-
modulated ﬁtness of organism i is then calculated as follows:This content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on May 31, 2018 00:28:26 AM
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j
sji, (2)
where sji is the effect i’s social interaction with j has on i’s ﬁtness.1 This
gives us information about how many offspring i is expected to have and,
since i’s offspring tend to be like i, about how the composition of a popula-
tion is expected to change.2
2.2. Hamilton’s Rule, the Price Equation, and Kin Selection. Hamilton’s
rule, famously associated with inclusive ﬁtness, gives a condition for the in-
crease of an altruistic behavior, where an organism performs an action that
decreases its own ﬁtness and increases the ﬁtness of another. (An exam-
ple of a model of the evolution of altruistic traits will be given in sec. 4.2.)
It says simply that if the relatedness-weighted beneﬁt of a trait exceeds its
cost, then we should expect selection to favor that trait. That is, the trait is
favored when
bR 2 c > 0, (3)
where b is the beneﬁt to the focal organism’s social partner and c is the cost to
the focal organism.
Many results within the inclusive ﬁtness framework, including Hamil-
ton’s rule, are derived from the Price equation, which is a general descrip-
tion of evolutionary change. Let f be the ﬁtness of a trait in the population,
relative to the average ﬁtness in the population. Then, the Price equation
describes expected evolutionary change in the following way:
_E pð Þ 5 Cov f , pð Þ: (4)
We can think of p as the average phenotypic value of the population, al-
though p can actually represent anything a modeler might want to keep
track of: phenotypic value, genetic value, frequency of a trait, and so on.1. Note that the deﬁnition of neighbor-modulated ﬁtness looks formally different from
inclusive ﬁtness as ﬁtness effects are unweighted, while the ﬁtness effects in inclusive
ﬁtness are weighted by a relatedness parameter. This apparent asymmetry disappears
at the population level when we calculate the ﬁtness of organisms with a certain trait.
See sec. 4.1 for a calculation of neighbor-modulated ﬁtness at the population level.
For more information on the calculations of these two types of ﬁtness, see Frank
(1998, 48–49) and Birch (2016).
2. Technically, both inclusive ﬁtness and neighbor-modulated ﬁtness include a baseline
nonsocial ﬁtness component, so these calculations are the ﬁtness effects of the social
trait of interest.
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DEBATE OVER INCLUSIVE FITNESS 5The change in the average value is then _E(p). The covariance term measures
how ﬁtness changes with differences in phenotype.3
When ﬁtness effects are additive, that is, when the ﬁtness effects on the
recipient do not depend on the recipient’s genotype/phenotype and ﬁtness
effects from all an organism’s social interactions can simply be added up,
we can derive equations for both inclusive ﬁtness and neighbor-modulated
ﬁtness from the Price equation.4 These equations are discussed further in the
appendix, but here we will look at Hamilton’s rule as derived from the Price
equation. The inclusive ﬁtness version of Hamilton’s rule is
_E(g) > 0 when bsi2ip 
Cov p, g0ð Þ
Cov p, gð Þ 2 bsiip > 0: (5)
When we can interpret the covariance between an organism’s phenotype
and its own ﬁtness (bsiip) as a ‘cost’ and the covariance between an organ-
ism’s phenotype and its social partner’s ﬁtness (bsi2ip) as a ‘beneﬁt’, we
have Hamilton’s rule, where R 5 Cov( p, g0)=Cov( p, g). This measure of re-
latedness compares the covariance between a focal organism’s phenotype,
p, and its social partner’s genotype, g 0, with the covariance between the fo-
cal organism’s phenotype and its own genotype, g (Orlove and Wood
1978). It is a measure of the degree to which the focal organism and its so-
cial partner are genetically related, or how likely it is that the ﬁtness effects
from a trait fall on organisms with the gene(s) encoding for the trait.
Section 4.1 and the appendix discuss how inclusive ﬁtness results de-
rived from the Price equation are related to the replicator dynamics, which
is often used in game theoretic models, using methods drawn from Page and
Nowak (2002). Section 4.2 will discuss how this deﬁnition of relatedness
matches up with the deﬁnition of relatedness we will use in game theoretic
models. Section 5.2 will discuss versions of Hamilton’s rule that do not rely
on the assumption of additive ﬁtness components in relation to the results
discussed here.
Relatedness is commonly thought of as a measure of the average kinship
between interacting organisms when talking about kin selection for a trait.
However, it is widely acknowledged that R, and many methods for calcu-3. There is sometimes a second term, Ef ( _p), included that measures the ﬁtness-weighted
transmission bias, the difference between the phenotypic value of a parent and the av-
erage phenotypic value of its offspring. It is often assumed that Ef ( _p) 5 0, which is gen-
erally thought of as assuming there is no transmission bias. (Assuming that Ef ( _p) 5 0
is not exactly the same as assuming there is no transmission bias [van Veelen 2005],
but the details of what exactly it means to assume Ef ( _p) 5 0 are not crucial here.)
4. The additivity of ﬁtness effects requires satisfying these two conditions, which Birch
(2016) refers to as actor’s control and weak additivity. Actually, only the second condi-
tion is required to derive neighbor-modulated ﬁtness, while both are required to derive
inclusive ﬁtness. See Birch (2016) for a discussion of this.
This content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on May 31, 2018 00:28:26 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
6 HANNAH RUBIN
All ulating R, can be thought of as general measures of correlation between types
(Marshall 2015). In this case, R can measure how likely it is that altruists
interact with other altruists regardless of whether that correlation is caused
by interacting with kin or by some other mechanism, such as a green-beard
effect where altruists are able to recognize and preferentially interact with
other altruists.
Because inclusive ﬁtness is often used in describing traits that evolve via
kin selection, the terms ‘inclusive ﬁtness’ and ‘kin selection’ are sometimes
used interchangeably. However, it is important to distinguish inclusive ﬁt-
ness from kin selection. Inclusive ﬁtness is a method of calculating ﬁtness,
as described above. Kin selection, however, refers to the selection of a trait
because of beneﬁts falling differentially on relatives. Inclusive ﬁtness is a
mathematical framework used to describe evolution of a trait; kin selection
is a mechanism by which traits can evolve (e.g., Hamilton 1975; Grafen
2007a).
Some of the critiques of inclusive ﬁtness models are aimed at showing
that kin selection has been less important as an evolutionary force than many
inclusive ﬁtness theorists presume (see, e.g., Wilson 2012). Other parts of
the criticism are aimed at the mathematical framework of inclusive ﬁtness
itself, such as claims that there are mathematical difﬁculties with the calcu-
lations in inclusive ﬁtness (Nowak et al. 2010; Traulsen 2010; Wilson 2012).
This article will not discuss whether kin selection provides an adequate expla-
nation of prosocial behavior. Instead, it looks at whether inclusive ﬁtness
can provide an adequate mathematical framework for use in evolutionary
models. Kin selection is discussed only in considering how inclusive ﬁt-
ness can be used in models of traits evolving via kin selection. This focus
will help us see which aspects of the debate are relevant to the inclusive
ﬁtness framework and which pertain to kin selection explanations of the
evolution of particular traits. Section 5 will discuss this further.
3. The Debate Surrounding Methods. There are several critiques levied
against the inclusive ﬁtness framework. This article will address a couple of
particularly important critiques that, as we will see, can be understood in
light of an emphasis on different modeling techniques: the critiques that in-
clusive ﬁtness requires the assumption of weak selection and cannot pro-
vide dynamically sufﬁcient models. Here, I give a description of these cri-
tiques and a brief motivation for thinking of them as arising from different
sides of the debate emphasizing different methodologies. Section 5 pro-
vides a more detailed argument for this conclusion using material that will
be laid out in section 4.
3.1. Weak Selection. First, inclusive ﬁtness has been critiqued for re-
quiring the assumption of weak selection. In assuming that there is weakThis content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on May 31, 2018 00:28:26 AM
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DEBATE OVER INCLUSIVE FITNESS 7selection, we assume that gene frequencies are not changing or that the
changes in gene frequencies are small enough to be ignored.5 This assump-
tion is used in various ways in inclusive ﬁtness models: in employing esti-
mation methods for calculating relatedness, in ignoring higher-order effects
or certain types of population structure, and so on.
It is easy to seewhy certainmethods of estimating relatedness requireweak
selection. For example, unless very special conditions hold, estimating relat-
edness using pedigrees, or family trees, requires that selection is weak. If gene
frequencies are systematically changing in the population, the relatedness of
an organism to its siblings, for example, will change as the genetic composi-
tion of its siblings changes (Grafen 1984). However, calculating relatedness
does not, in general, require weak selection, and we can calculate how relat-
edness changes as gene frequencies change (Grafen 1985; Birch 2014a; Mar-
shall 2015).
The assumption of weak selection is also used because it allows one to
ignore nonadditive ﬁtness effects. That is, the assumption of weak selection
has been used to ignore things like synergistic effects (where organisms re-
ceive additional beneﬁts from cooperation if they both cooperate) or the ef-
fects of competition over resources. This is perhaps the more important use
of the assumption of weak selection, as it allows one to separate the way an
organism affects its own ﬁtness (a self-effect) from the way it affects its so-
cial partner’s ﬁtness (an other effect) in cases in which the simplifying as-
sumption of additive ﬁtness components is false. Note that this critique also
applies to neighbor-modulated ﬁtness, as the ﬁtness effects are similarly sep-
arated into self- and other-effect components. At some points in the debate, it
seems that critics argue against the use of inclusive ﬁtness (and neighbor-
modulated ﬁtness) because it requires weak selection in order to achieve
the separation of ﬁtness components. That is, without the assumption of weak
selection, one is restricted to a special case inwhichﬁtness effects are additive,
leading to the conclusion that inclusive ﬁtness is less general than ‘standard’
natural selection (Nowak et al. 2010).
However, at some points it seems that critics want to claim that, whether
or not ﬁtness effects can be split into additive components, inclusive ﬁtness
calculations require weak selection. For instance, Nowak et al. (2010) claim
that “inclusive ﬁtness theory cannot even be deﬁned for nonvanishing se-
lection; thus the assumption of weak selection is automatic” (SI 14). It is5. One way to achieve this in a model is to write down ﬁtness as the sum of two com-
ponents: f 5 f0 1 dfx. One of these, f0, is the ‘background’ ﬁtness, the ﬁtness organisms
get from things that are not related to the trait of interest. This is the same for all organ-
isms. The ﬁtness the organisms get from things related to the trait of interest, fx, is then
weighted by a parameter d, and as we take d to zero, we approach the limit of weak se-
lection. This is what Wild and Traulsen (2007) refer to as ‘d-weak selection’.
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All uthis second, stronger, claim that will addressed here. In section 4, the claim
will be shown to be clearly false using modeling techniques from evolution-
ary game theory, one of the preferred frameworks of critics of inclusive ﬁt-
ness. Section 5 will then discuss how, if we read the debate as about inclu-
sive ﬁtness theory as a set of methods rather than inclusive ﬁtness theory as
a framework for calculating ﬁtness, we can make sense of this claim.
3.2. Dynamic Sufﬁciency. Inclusive ﬁtness has also been criticized for
not being able to provide dynamically sufﬁcient models (Nowak et al. 2010;
Wilson 2012). In a dynamically sufﬁcient model, information about the
population at any particular time is enough to make predictions about the
population at all future times. So, information about a population at some
starting time is enough to be able to predict how the population will evolve
at all future times. In a dynamically sufﬁcient model, one can predict whether
the population will reach an equilibrium, a state at which the population is no
longer evolving, and what the population composition will be at the equilib-
rium should it reach one.6 Critics of inclusive ﬁtness argue that it cannot be
used to describe the evolutionary trajectories or end points of evolution
(Nowak et al. 2010, SI 4).
One reason this criticism might be leveled against inclusive ﬁtness is the
general reliance on the Price equation, which is not dynamically sufﬁcient.7
More speciﬁcally, the Price equation itself is neither dynamically sufﬁcient
nor insufﬁcient (because it merely expresses a mathematical identity), but it
can be either, depending on what sort of model it is used with. When we do
have a dynamically sufﬁcient model, the Price equation will correctly de-
scribe evolutionary change in the model but will not itself give any addi-
tional predictions (van Veelen et al. 2012).
Because many of the results in inclusive ﬁtness theory, like Hamilton’s
rule, are formulated in absence of a particular model, and because the focus
is often on estimating the covariances rather than calculating them from an
evolutionary model, we might not always get dynamically sufﬁcient models
within the framework. These estimations of parameters will only predict the
evolutionary outcome if they do not change over time, which is not the case
when selection is frequency dependent (Nowak et al. 2010; Allen et al.
2013). However, as we will see in section 4, the regression methods often6. This article only deals with deterministic models, but stochastic models can also be
dynamically sufﬁcient. A stochastic model is dynamically sufﬁcient when the informa-
tion about the probability distribution over types at some starting time is enough to pre-
dict how the probability distribution will evolve at all future times and to predict the lim-
iting distribution.
7. Another reason, which will be discussed further in secs. 3.3 and 5.2, is that many of
the results that do not rely on the Price equation are focused solely on equilibrium anal-
ysis. See, e.g., Taylor and Frank (1996).
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DEBATE OVER INCLUSIVE FITNESS 9emphasized in inclusive ﬁtness theory are intimately connected with the
sort of dynamically sufﬁcient models preferred by critics of inclusive ﬁt-
ness.
3.3. The Debate over Methodologies. Critics of inclusive ﬁtness often
propose population genetics or evolutionary game theory as alternative
frameworks in which one can provide models that are dynamically sufﬁ-
cient and that do not require stringent assumptions like weak selection
(Nowak et al. 2010, 2011; Traulsen 2010; Allen et al. 2013; Allen and
Nowak 2015). It is not immediately clear how we should read this proposal,
because although it is true that inclusive ﬁtness tends to be used in quanti-
tative genetics models (Frank 2013) and is seen as primarily a quantitative
method in spirit (Queller 1992), it has been used in both game theoretic
(e.g., Skyrms 2002; van Veelen 2009, 2011) and population genetics mod-
els (e.g., Rousset 2002; Grafen 2007b; Lehmann and Rousset 2014). In fact,
when Hamilton (1964) ﬁrst proposed using inclusive ﬁtness, he did so in the
context of a population genetics model.
The methods used in quantitative genetics are designed to handle contin-
uously varying traits, such as height or weight. In models of social behavior,
a continuously varying trait could be the probability of performing an altru-
istic action. Models within quantitative genetics tend to emphasize simplic-
ity andmeasurability. Thesemodels usually start with observations about phe-
notypes, or other easily measurable quantities, with few assumptions about
the underlying genetics of a trait. This method of modeling involves abstrac-
tions, ignoring complicating details of the situation by merely leaving them
out while still giving a description that is literally true (Godfrey-Smith 2009).
The Price equation is often used within this approach. As mentioned in sec-
tion 2.2, many of the common results within inclusive ﬁtness theory are de-
rived from the Price equation.
By contrast, challenges to the inclusive ﬁtness framework tend to come
from population genetics (Frank 2013, 1153). This is an approach that tends
to start with speciﬁc assumptions (such as assuming we know the underly-
ing genetics of a trait, the mutation rates, etc.) and make predictions based
on those assumptions. Models within this approach tend to be dynamically
sufﬁcient, meaning that information about the population at any particular
time is enough to make predictions about the population at all future times.
The use of simplifying assumptions also means that these models make use
of idealizations rather than abstractions. That is, they talk about populations
that have features we know real populations do not have (e.g., inﬁnite pop-
ulation size, no mutations) in order to provide a simple model. One way to
think about models using idealizations is that they describe nonactual, ﬁc-
tional populations that we take to be similar to real populations in important
ways (Godfrey-Smith 2009). As mentioned, critics propose evolutionaryThis content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on May 31, 2018 00:28:26 AM
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All ugame theory as an alternative to the inclusive ﬁtness framework.8 The rep-
licator dynamics is often used within this approach. This dynamics re-
quires many idealizing assumptions, which will be discussed in section 4.1.
The rest of this article will look more closely at the use of inclusive ﬁt-
ness in evolutionary game theory, focusing on the replicator dynamics.
Since inclusive ﬁtness is not as commonly used in evolutionary game the-
ory, this will help us see the beneﬁts and drawbacks of using inclusive ﬁt-
ness in highly idealized models. This article will also compare how inclu-
sive ﬁtness calculations can be used in evolutionary game theory with some
of their uses in quantitative genetics. This comparison between the use of
inclusive ﬁtness within these two traditions for studying evolution will be
helpful in understanding key issues in the debate, since they represent ex-
tremes of methodologies using idealizations and abstractions: the replicator
dynamics of evolutionary game theory is highly idealized, while the Price
equation often employed in quantitative genetics uses only abstractions. We
will see how some of the disagreement arises out of the sides of the debate
emphasizing different methodologies and how this relates to arguments
over the usefulness of Hamilton’s rule.
It is important to note that, while this distinction between abstract models
in quantitative genetics and idealized models in evolutionary game theory is
illuminating for the present purposes, it does not capture the full variety of
modeling techniques within the two methodological traditions. There are
evolutionary game theoretic models that make the assumption of weak se-
lection in order to abstract away from genetic details and fail to be dynam-
ically sufﬁcient. For instance, Taylor and Frank (1996) employ a weak se-
lection assumption, allowing them to approximate regression coefﬁcients
using partial derivatives, in order to use standard maximization techniques
for ﬁnding evolutionarily stable strategies (28). This method can be used to
derive ‘approximate’ versions of Hamilton’s rule, which will be described
further in section 5.2.
This article focuses on the special case in which ﬁtness effects are addi-
tive. This is a starting point to examine how inclusive ﬁtness can be calcu-
lated in idealized evolutionary game theoretic models and to see whether
there is any beneﬁt to using inclusive ﬁtness in this context. We will see that
the assumption of weak selection is not essential to the calculation of inclu-
sive ﬁtness and that one can build dynamically sufﬁcient models using in-
clusive ﬁtness. There is, of course, further work to be done to see whether8. Evolutionary game theory and population genetics are sometimes seen as having dis-
tinct methods, and other times they are seen as more or less continuous (Hammerstein
and Selten 1994, 953). They are loosely grouped together here because they are similar
in that models within both approaches tend to start with speciﬁc assumptions and be dy-
namically sufﬁcient.
This content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on May 31, 2018 00:28:26 AM
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DEBATE OVER INCLUSIVE FITNESS 11and how this can extend into the more complicated cases generally talked
about in inclusive ﬁtness theory. The relationship between these results and
general versions of Hamilton’s rule, which do not require weak selection and
do not assume additive ﬁtness components, will be discussed in section 5.2.
Note, however, that while the special case of additive ﬁtness effects will not
be applicable to many traits of interest in the real world, it is an important spe-
cial case that has been studied extensively in a variety of contexts even out-
side of the inclusive ﬁtness framework (e.g., Eliashberg and Winkler 1981;
Chakraborty and Harbaugh 2007; Maciejewski, Fu, and Hauert 2014).4. Inclusive Fitness in Evolutionary Game Theory. Inclusive ﬁtness and
neighbor-modulated ﬁtness are commonly viewed as ‘formally equivalent’
in that they yield the same predictions in terms of the direction of evolution-
ary change. That is, they give the same conditions for when a social trait is
favored by evolution (see Birch [2016] and references therein). This section
will show that, in the special case discussed above, we can prove further that
they also give the same prediction for magnitude of evolutionary change.
Section 4.1 will prove that the two calculations of ﬁtness are equivalent when
used with the replicator dynamics, a standard model from evolutionary game
theory. These results are then compared to more common calculations of in-
clusive ﬁtness in the appendix, which proves the equivalence between the rep-
licator dynamics and both the neighbor-modulated and inclusive ﬁtness cal-
culations derived from the Price equation. Then, section 4.2 provides a simple
example to illustrate the connections between these ﬁtness calculations.
4.1. Inclusive Fitness and Neighbor-Modulated Fitness in Evolutionary
Game Theory. In evolutionary game theoretic models, the replicator dy-
namics is a standard model of the evolutionary process. Under this dynamic,
if the ﬁtness of a trait is greater than the average ﬁtness of the population,
the frequency of the trait will increase. The traits of interest dictate behavior
in some social interaction, so a trait’s ﬁtness is determined by how well it
does against the other possible traits in the population (in addition to the
population composition). If xt is the frequency of the trait of interest, and
ft(x) is its ﬁtness in a population of composition x, the replicator dynamics
is governed by the following equation:
_xt 5 xt ft xð Þ 2 f xð Þ½ , (6)
where f (x) is the average ﬁtness in the population. There are a number of
assumptions involved in using the replicator dynamics, notably that the
population size is inﬁnite and there are a ﬁnite number of traits.
Since we are trying to see whether the trait of interest is favored, we can
calculate the ﬁtness of organisms that have the trait and the ﬁtness of thoseThis content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on May 31, 2018 00:28:26 AM
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All uthat do not in order to have a full description of evolutionary change accord-
ing to the replicator dynamics. As mentioned, we will look at the case in
which there are additive ﬁtness effects. If we assume further that there
are pairwise interactions, we can denote organism i’s social partner as
2i. In this case, we can write the neighbor-modulated ﬁtness of the organ-
isms with the trait of interest as
ft xð Þ 5 P T2i Tij Þ sii 1 si2ið Þ 1 P N2ið jTið Þsii
5 sii 1 P T2ijTið Þsi2i,
(7)
where P(T2ijTi) is the probability an organism with the trait will interact
with another organism that has the trait and where P(N2ijTi) is the probabil-
ity an organism with the trait will interact with an organism that does not
have the trait. Similarly, the neighbor-modulated ﬁtness of organisms with-
out the trait of interest is
fn xð Þ 5 P T2ijNið Þsi2i, (8)
where P(T2ijNi) is the probability an organism that does not have the trait
will interact with another organism that does have the trait.
The inclusive ﬁtness of organisms with the trait of interest is (now using
w for inclusive ﬁtness to distinguish it from neighbor-modulated ﬁtness, f )
wt xð Þ 5 sii 1 Rsi2i, (9)
and the inclusive ﬁtness of not having the trait is 0. The relatedness between
interacting organisms, R, is deﬁned as a difference in conditional probabil-
ities (Skyrms 2002; van Veelen 2009; Okasha and Martens 2016). The re-
latedness of a focal organism to its social partner is the probability that the
social partner has a trait given the focal organism does minus the probability
the social partner has the trait given that the focal organism does not:
R 5 P T2i Tij Þ 2 P T2ið jNið Þ: (10)
This is a measure of the degree to which the focal organism’s phenotype
predicts its social partner’s phenotype.9 Since genotypes (to a certain extent)
predict phenotypes, this can also be thought of as a measure of genetic re-
latedness.109. Why this is the right deﬁnition to use is shown in Skyrms (2002). For a demonstration
that the assortment rate from Grafen (1979) commonly used in the replicator dynamics is
equivalent to a covariance deﬁnition of relatedness derived from the Price equation, see
Marshall (2015, chap. 5, n. 1).
10. Note that relatedness is not just the probability that the two organisms share the al-
lele of interest. It is a measure of their genetic similarity relative to the genetic compo-
This content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on May 31, 2018 00:28:26 AM
se subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
DEBATE OVER INCLUSIVE FITNESS 13If we start with the replicator dynamics with neighbor-modulated ﬁtness
as our measure of ﬁtness, we can show that it is equivalent to using the
replicator dynamics with inclusive ﬁtness as our measure of ﬁtness:
_xt 5 xt ft xð Þ 2 f xð Þ½ 
5 xt sii 1 P T2i Tij Þsi2i 2 xt sii 1 P T2ið jTið Þsi2ið Þ 2 xn P T2i Nij Þsi2ið Þð ½
5 xt sii 2 xtsii 1 P T2ið jTi½ Þsi2i 2 xtP T2i Tij Þsi2i 2 1 2 xtð ÞP T2ið jNið Þsi2i
5 xt sii 1 P T2i Tij Þ 2 P T2ið jNið Þð Þsi2i 2 xtsii 2 xt P T2i Tij Þ 2 P T2ið jNið Þð Þsi2i½ 
5 xt sii 1 Rsi2i 2 xt sii 1 Rsi2ið Þ½ 
5 xt wt xð Þ 2 w xð Þ½ :
That is, neighbor-modulated ﬁtness and inclusive ﬁtness are equivalent
when used with the replicator dynamics, a standard model of evolution used
in evolutionary game theory.11
The appendix shows further that, given the assumptions stated above, us-
ing the replicator dynamics is equivalent to the Price equation with either
method of calculating ﬁtness. That is, what follows are equivalent descrip-
tions of evolutionary change:
1. The replicator dynamics used with neighbor-modulated ﬁtness
2. The replicator dynamics used with inclusive ﬁtness
3. The Price equation used with neighbor-modulated ﬁtness
4. The Price equation used with inclusive ﬁtness
The equivalence between 1 and 3 is demonstrated in appendix A. The gen-
eral strategy is the same as the one used in Page and Nowak (2002). First,
show that the Price equation used with neighbor-modulated ﬁtness (3) is de-
scriptive of a population evolving according to the replicator dynamics used
with neighbor-modulated ﬁtness (1); then, show that when there are a ﬁnite
number of types, 3 is also descriptive of a population evolving according to
1. Using the same strategy, we can show that 2 and 4 are equivalent. This is
done in appendix B. Note that these four ways of modeling evolutionary
change are shown to be equivalent in that they give the same prediction11. For a discussion of the relationship between inclusive ﬁtness and neighbor-modulated
ﬁtness in games that do not assume pairwise interactions, but with a constant relatedness,
see van Veelen (2011).
sition of the population as a whole. This is important because in studying altruism, for
example, we want to know whether the beneﬁts of altruistic acts fall on altruists sufﬁ-
ciently more often than they fall on nonaltruists. That is, the beneﬁts must fall on altru-
ists rather than nonaltruists with sufﬁcient frequency to give them a reproductive advan-
tage over nonaltruists. We will see an example of how R depends on the population’s
genetic composition in sec. 4.2.
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All ufor both the direction and magnitude of evolutionary change. This goes be-
yond what is commonly meant by the claim that neighbor-modulated ﬁtness
and inclusive ﬁtness are equivalent, which is that they give the same predic-
tion for the direction of evolutionary change (see Birch [2016] and refer-
ences therein).
The next section provides a simple model using inclusive ﬁtness in the
context of evolutionary game theory. This simple illustrative example will
let us see, in more concrete terms, the beneﬁts and disadvantages of using
inclusive ﬁtness in such an idealized setting. Section 5 discusses how to un-
derstand these equivalences in the context of the inclusive ﬁtness debate.4.2. A Simple Model: Altruism with Haploid Siblings. This section
will provide an idealized model using haploid siblings to show how one
can dynamically model relatedness within the inclusive ﬁtness framework
when selection is not weak. We will assume that these organisms either
have the altruistic trait or not, which is completely determined by whether
they receive a certain gene from their parent. So that the relationship be-
tween this model and Hamilton’s rule is clear, we will assume that when
an organism has the altruistic trait, it pays a cost c and bestows a beneﬁt
b on its social partner. When an organism lacks the altruistic trait, it does
not pay the cost and does not beneﬁt its social partner. In this model, an or-
ganism’s social partner is its sibling. On the basis of these assumptions, we
can calculate the inclusive ﬁtness of altruists to be
fa 5 2c 1 Rb: (11)
The inclusive ﬁtness of nonaltruists is 0 because they do not perform any
action (relevant to our trait of interest) that affects their own or their social
partner’s reproduction. Thus, altruism will spread when bR 2 c > 0.
Since the relatedness of haploid siblings is determined by the genetic
material they receive from their common parent, we can let p be the fre-
quency of altruists in the parent generation and use this to calculate related-
ness among the offspring. We will also account for a small mutation rate m
in the calculation of relatedness. Once we rewrite the probabilities (accord-
ing to the deﬁnition of conditional probability) so that they are easier to cal-
culate from the assumptions of the model, we can calculate the relatedness
of an altruist to its haploid sibling in the following way:
R 5 P A2i Aij Þ 2 P A2ið jNið Þ
5
P A2i & Aið Þ
P Aið Þ 2
P A2i & Nið Þ
P Nið Þ
5
p 1 2 mð Þ21 1 2 pð Þm2
p 1 2 mð Þ 1 1 2 pð Þm 2
p 1 2 mð Þm 1 1 2 pð Þ 1 2 mð Þm
pm 1 1 2 pð Þ 1 2 mð Þ :This content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on May 31, 2018 00:28:26 AM
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DEBATE OVER INCLUSIVE FITNESS 15Brieﬂy, here is how to understand this calculation. The numerator of the ﬁrst
term is the probability of two haploid siblings both being altruists. Since
there are two ways to get two altruistic offspring, we can calculate this as
the probability the parent is an altruist (p) times the probability it has two
offspring without mutations ((1 2 m)2) plus the probability the parent is a
nonaltruist (1 2 p) times the probability it has two offspring that both have
a mutation (m2). The denominator of the ﬁrst term is then the frequency of
altruists in the offspring generation. These offspring can come from an al-
truist parent without mutation or from a nonaltruist parent with mutation.
The second term is calculated similarly. The numerator is the probability
that a focal nonaltruist will have an altruist sibling: the probability that
the parent is an altruist and the focal organism mutates while its sibling does
not plus the probability the parent is a nonaltruist and the focal organism
does not mutate while its sibling does. This is divided by the frequency
of nonaltruists in the offspring generation.
Figure 1 shows how R will change when the population’s composition
changes.12 In particular, it shows that relatedness decreases as the popula-
tion becomes more uniform.13 To see why this is the case, it is easiest to look
at the extremes of p 5 0 and p 5 1. When p 5 0, the parent population is
entirely composed of nonaltruists. In the offspring generation, altruists only
exist because of mutation. The probability an altruist has an altruist sibling
is just m, the probability that the sibling also has a mutation. However, the
probability that a nonaltruist has an altruist sibling is also m, the probability
that the sibling has a mutation. So R 5 P(A2ijAi) 2 P(A2ijNi) 5 0. Similar
reasoning applies when p 5 1. The parent population is composed entirelyFigure 1. Relatedness graphed over the frequency of altruists in the parent popula-
tion, for m 5 0:1.12. This graph was created with a mutation rate of m 5 0:1, which is a fairly high mu-
tation rate. This mutation rate was chosen in order to make the graphs more readable.
Results similar to those described in this section can be obtained with much smaller mu-
tation rates.
13. For a demonstration of this in a more general setting, see Rousset (2002).
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All uof altruists, so any nonaltruists in the offspring generation arise through
mutation. This means that although altruists are likely to have altruist sib-
lings, nonaltruists are equally likely to have altruist siblings. So although
P(A2ijAi) is high at 1 2 m, P(A2ijNi) is also 1 2 m, and R 5 0.
We can also calculate relatedness in this model using covariances or re-
gressions. Since phenotypes in this idealized model are completely deter-
mined by genotypes (an organism with the altruistic gene is assumed to
be an altruist), we can write
R 5
Cov p, g0ð Þ
Cov p, gð Þ 5
Cov g, g0ð Þ
Cov g, gð Þ 5 bg0g: (12)
For any population composition, we can perform a regression to calculate
the value of R, and it will give the same value of relatedness as the proba-
bilistic deﬁnition of relatedness. Figure 2 gives a way to visualize why this
is the case. In this model, an organism’s genetic value, g, is 1 if it has the
gene for altruism and 0 if it does not. Thus, there are four possible places
for data points on a graph of g versus g 0: the four corners of the graph. Then,
when we do a regression of g on g 0, what matters is how many data points
are in each of these locations. When the focal organisms’ genetic value is 1,
its social partner’s genotype will on average be P(A2ijAi). Similarly, when
the focal organisms’ genetic value is 0, its social partner’s genotype will on
average be P(A2ijNi). As shown in ﬁgure 2, this is the intercept of the re-
gression, and the regression coefﬁcient is bg0g 5 P(A2ijAi) 2 P(A2ijNi).Figure 2. Illustration of a 5 P(A2ijNi) and bg0g 5 P(A2ijAi) 2 P(A2ijNi).This content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on May 31, 2018 00:28:26 AM
se subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
DEBATE OVER INCLUSIVE FITNESS 17The inclusive ﬁtness of altruists depends on R, so it also changes as the
population composition changes. Figure 3 shows how the inclusive ﬁtness
of altruists compares with the inclusive ﬁtness of nonaltruists over the pos-
sible population compositions, for b 5 18 and c 5 10. Since relatedness
drops off as the population becomes uniform, the inclusive ﬁtness of altru-
ists drops off as the population becomes more uniform. For many possible
values of b, c, and m this means that altruists will have a ﬁtness advantage
for some area around p 5 :5, but their ﬁtness will drop below the ﬁtness of
nonaltruists as the population becomes more uniform.
These calculations of relatedness and inclusive ﬁtness can be used in a
dynamic model where frequencies of genotypes are changing over time;
we use these calculations with an appropriate dynamics to see how the pop-
ulation will evolve and to ﬁnd the equilibria. For this model, we use the
selection-mutation dynamics, which is just like the replicator dynamics ex-
cept that there is an extra term that keeps track of mutations.14
Figure 4 shows the dynamical analysis of this model, using both inclu-
sive ﬁtness and neighbor-modulated ﬁtness. Figures 4a and 4b show, re-
spectively, how inclusive ﬁtness and neighbor-modulated ﬁtness change
as the population composition changes. Figures 4c and 4d show the evolu-
tionary trajectories in the population, in terms of the change in frequency of
altruists. When this change is positive (when the solid line is above the X-
axis, which is represented by the dashed line in ﬁgs. 4c and 4d), altruists
will increase in frequency. Likewise when the change is negative, altruists
will decrease in frequency. Information about the magnitude of selectiveFigure 3. Inclusive ﬁtness graphed over the frequency of altruists in the parent pop-
ulation, for m 5 0:1, b 5 18, and c 5 10.14. With the selection-mutation dynamics, a population with two types will evolve ac-
cording to the following equation: _xt 5 xt½ ft (x) 2 f (x) 1 m(1 2 2xt). Note that since
this is the same as the replicator dynamics except for the mutation term, which does
not depend on the deﬁnition of ft(x), we can prove that using neighbor-modulated ﬁtness
and inclusive ﬁtness will be equivalent in the same way as in sec. 4.1.
This content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on May 31, 2018 00:28:26 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
18 HANNAH RUBIN
All upressures is also represented; the further the solid line is from zero, the more
selective pressure there is and the faster the population composition will
change.
Comparing ﬁgures 4a and 4b shows that the two methods of calculating
ﬁtness do yield different numerical values of ﬁtness. However, in compar-
ing the evolutionary trajectory found using inclusive ﬁtness in ﬁgure 4c
with the trajectory calculated using neighbor-modulated ﬁtness in ﬁgure
4d, one can see that the choice between these ﬁtness measures makes no
difference for predicting the evolution of the population, either for the quan-
titative predictions of the amount of evolutionary change over time or the
qualitative predictions about the evolutionary outcomes based on the model.
That is, in this simple model, inclusive ﬁtness and neighbor-modulated ﬁt-
ness both give us the same answer when we ask how much altruists willFigure 4. Comparison of inclusive ﬁtness and neighbor-modulated ﬁtness, for m 5
0:1, b 5 18, and c 5 10. Comparing the calculations of inclusive ﬁtness (a) and
neighbor-modulated ﬁtness (b) shows how the calculations of the two types of ﬁt-
nesses differ. Comparing the change in the frequency of altruists found using inclu-
sive ﬁtness (c) and neighbor-modulated ﬁtness (d) shows that the evolutionary tra-
jectories are the same regardless of which calculation of ﬁtness is used.This content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on May 31, 2018 00:28:26 AM
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DEBATE OVER INCLUSIVE FITNESS 19increase or decrease in frequency, across all possible population composi-
tions.
We can also use either type of ﬁtness calculation to ﬁnd when the change
in altruists is zero, when frequencies are not changing and the population is
at an equilibrium. With the values of m, b, and c chosen here, there are four
equilibria, two of which are stable: one at about 1% altruists and one at
about 75% altruists.15
5. Discussion. We can see from section 4 not only that inclusive ﬁtness is
perfectly well suited for use in evolutionary game theory but also that weak
selection is not a necessary assumption for inclusive ﬁtness calculations and
that these calculations can be part of dynamically sufﬁcient models. Some
methods of calculating or estimating inclusive ﬁtness may require stringent
assumptions, but the calculations in general do not always require extra as-
sumptions. How are we to understand this in the context of the debate over
inclusive ﬁtness?
5.1. Inclusive Fitness with Idealized Models. Some of the disagree-
ment over inclusive ﬁtness can be understood as arising from two sides of
the debate emphasizing different methodologies. Recall from section 3.3
that inclusive ﬁtness is seen as fundamentally within the quantitative genet-
ics tradition, while critics of inclusive ﬁtness tend to favor population genet-
ics or evolutionary game theory. This means that inclusive ﬁtness theorists
tend to favor models that make use of abstractions, leaving details out while
still providing literally true general claims about evolution. By contrast, evo-
lutionary game theory, one of the preferred frameworks of the critics of in-
clusive ﬁtness, tends to provide highly idealized models, making many as-
sumptions that we know are not true of any real population but that allow us
to develop a simple model of a ﬁctional population that we think is similar to
the real world in important ways.
As discussed in section 4.1, when there is an inﬁnite population and a
ﬁnite number of types, inclusive ﬁtness calculations from quantitative genet-
ics and evolutionary game theory are equivalent. Since quantitative methods
are designed to handle continuously varying traits, assuming a ﬁnite number
of types takes the methods out of the context in which they were developed
and puts them into the context where dynamically sufﬁcient models can be
built. In doing so, we can get models with the kinds of properties valued by
critics of inclusive ﬁtness.15. An equilibrium is stable when selective pressures will cause the population to return
to the equilibrium if a small amount of drift changes gene frequencies in the population.
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All uOne way to think about this is that the regression methods developed by
inclusive ﬁtness theorists do not, in themselves, provide models with the
properties the critics of inclusive ﬁtness argue evolutionary models should
have. However, we can formulate idealized models that are dynamically
sufﬁcient and that incorporate selection that is not weak. Then, when we
abstract away from the particular details of genetic inheritance or popula-
tion structure assumed by the simpliﬁed models, we arrive at the abstract
equations based on the Price equation, which are often used in inclusive ﬁt-
ness theory. Section 4.1 (and the appendix) showed how, when we make sim-
plifying assumptions commonly made in evolutionary game theory, the
replicator dynamics and the versions of the Price equation often used in in-
clusive ﬁtness theory are equivalent descriptions of evolutionary change.
Section 4.2 gives an example of how the regression methods commonly
used in inclusive ﬁtness can be seen as abstract descriptions of models within
evolutionary game theory. In this simple model, we can track how Cov( p, g0)=
Cov( p, g) changes as the population evolves. Using covariances might
seem a bit unnatural in this overly simpliﬁed case: because we can calculate
the relatedness directly from the assumptions of the model, we do not need
to estimate it using the methods of quantitative genetics.
In fact, one might wonder whether there is any beneﬁt to be gained from
inclusive ﬁtness in this sort of simpliﬁed model. One of the main perceived
beneﬁts of inclusive ﬁtness is that it allows modelers to track changes in
traits rather than the genes encoding for these traits (which are very difﬁcult
to discover empirically) while accounting for genetics by using relatedness
(which is often not too difﬁcult to estimate in real populations; Queller
1992). Because we abstract away from the mechanisms of genetic inheri-
tance and how the genes encode for the trait of interest, summarizing this
with a ‘relatedness’ parameter, we can develop a phenotypic model that still
incorporates genetics in a way that can be empirically easy to measure. That
is, one can account for genetics without knowing or making assumptions
about the actual underlying genetics of a trait. When we switch to an evo-
lutionary game theoretic or a population genetics model, like the replicator
dynamics, we generally then must make assumptions about what these un-
derlying genetics are. We no longer use relatedness to estimate genetic as-
sortment; we can calculate the level of assortment directly.
So, to a certain extent one might think that it is appropriate that the de-
bate over inclusive ﬁtness is a debate over methods: although we can use
inclusive ﬁtness in the highly simpliﬁed models of evolutionary game the-
ory, in doing so we lose some of the main beneﬁts of the inclusive ﬁtness
framework. The statistical methods used in inclusive ﬁtness make the frame-
work particularly useful, although these methods may require weak selection
to split ﬁtness effects into additive components and do not provide dynami-
cally sufﬁcient models. Further, if we view the debate as being about the meth-This content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on May 31, 2018 00:28:26 AM
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DEBATE OVER INCLUSIVE FITNESS 21ods commonly used in quantitative genetics, we can see where these criti-
cisms come from.16 That is, since inclusive ﬁtness has often been seen as
fundamentally quantitative, and since one of the main beneﬁts of inclusive
ﬁtness (incorporating genetics in a way that is easy to estimate in real pop-
ulations) is generally tied up in the statistical methods arising out of quan-
titative genetics, it makes sense that the debate over inclusive ﬁtness will be
in part a debate over methods. However, the status of inclusive ﬁtness
should not be decided by a debate over the use of methods for which inclu-
sive ﬁtness is seen as particularly beneﬁcial.
The model in section 4.2 demonstrates that there can still be some beneﬁt
to calculating inclusive ﬁtness rather than neighbor-modulated ﬁtness even
in models that are highly idealized, where the level of assortment can be cal-
culated directly. The explanation given for why the population does not
evolve to a population composed entirely of altruists was that relatedness
drops off as the population becomes more uniformly altruistic. This sort of in-
tuitive explanation is not readily available when using neighbor-modulated
ﬁtness. Because the terms describing how the beneﬁts of altruism fall differ-
entially on altruists are split between two different ﬁtness calculations (one for
theﬁtness of altruists and one for theﬁtness of nonaltruists), there is no param-
eter that systemically changes as the population composition changes that we
can point to in order to explain why the ﬁtness of altruists drops off as the
population becomes more uniform.17
5.2. The Use of Hamilton’s Rule. Hamilton’s rule, the most famous re-
sult arising out of inclusive ﬁtness theory, has been criticized for not being
generally true, for not having any predictive power, and for being mislead-
ing in the absence of a particular model (Nowak et al. 2010). There is some
truth to these claims. To get Hamilton’s rule in the form bR 2 c > 0, where
c and b are interpreted as costs and beneﬁts as described in section 2.2, one
has to assume additive ﬁtness components as we have been doing through-
out this article. If ﬁtness components are not additive, then the rule will not
give a correct description of a condition for the spread of a trait. Addition-
ally, if we only have enough information to estimate b, c, and R at a partic-
ular point in time, we cannot predict the evolutionary outcome. Further, if16. This is, of course, not to say that these are the only methods used in inclusive ﬁtness
theory but that the critiques of inclusive ﬁtness are often wrapped up in critiques of the
statistical methods (see, e.g., Allen et al. 2013).
17. Others argue that inclusive ﬁtness is valuable because it allows us to maintain the
analogy of organisms acting as if they are maximizing ﬁtness (Grafen 2007b; West
and Gardner 2013; Okasha, Weymark, and Bossert 2014; Okasha and Martens 2016)
or more modestly that it allows us to explain the selection of social traits because of their
casual contributions to ﬁtness (Birch 2016). These beneﬁts would hold regardless of the
method one uses and so are not addressed here.
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All ubR 2 c > 0 when we estimate these parameters, we might even be misled
into thinking that the population will eventually be entirely altruistic if we
forget that the value of any of these parameters can change as the population
evolves. However, inclusive ﬁtness theorists will generally agree to this
(see, e.g., Marshall 2015) but maintain that Hamilton’s rule has both predic-
tive and explanatory power. It is not immediately clear where the disagree-
ment lies.18
The distinction between idealizations and abstractions can again be help-
ful in understanding part of the dispute. In particular, why should we expect
Hamilton’s rule to be true in general? Results derived within population ge-
netics and evolutionary game theory are never true in general, as they rely
on idealizations to achieve their simplicity. By contrast, Hamilton’s rule is
seen as a general result that is applicable to any real population one might
wish to study. This ﬁts well with its prominent role in quantitative genetics,
relying on abstractions rather than idealizing assumptions to help provide
“the general principles of social evolution theory” (Marshall 2015, xiv).
In this vein, there is emphasis on providing a version of Hamilton’s rule
that is generally true. Hamilton’s rule can be given in a very general form in
which we do not have to assume any particular population structure or ad-
ditive payoff affects (Gardner, West, and Wild 2011). Birch (2014b) and
Birch and Okasha (2015) describe this in detail, but we can think of the
‘cost’ and ‘beneﬁt’ terms in the rule as statistical associations between an
organism’s ﬁtness and its own genotype (a self-effect) and its social partner’s
genotype (an other effect), respectively. This general version of Hamilton’s
rule is true of any population. “In effect, this is because we are abstracting
away from the complex causal details of social interaction to focus on the
overarching statistical relationship between genotype and ﬁtness” (Birch
and Okasha 2015, 24).
The question is then whether this version of Hamilton’s rule has any pre-
dictive power. It can have predictive power if its components can be under-
stood causally instead of just statistically. That is, if the self-effect and other-
effect terms can be interpreted as ways in which the focal organism causally
contributes to its own and its social partner’s ﬁtness, we have a model that
can be used to make predictions rather than just a statistical summary of evo-
lution within a population. However, as Birch and Okasha (2015) explain, it
is not entirely clear when a causal interpretation can be provided.
There are, however, a variety of different rules that go under the name
‘Hamilton’s rule’, each of which follows from different assumptions about
the evolutionary process. We can describe these versions of Hamilton’s rule
as falling into three categories. There are ‘special’ versions of the rule (where18. See Marshall (2015, chap. 6, n. 9) for an example of an inclusive ﬁtness model
where parameters can change as the population evolves.
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DEBATE OVER INCLUSIVE FITNESS 23the b and c terms are interpreted as payoffs in a model) and ‘approximate’
versions (which provide marginal approximations of the general versions
of the rule) in addition to the ‘general’ version described above (Birch and
Okasha 2015).
In the version of Hamilton’s rule in section 3.1, the b and c terms are in-
terpreted as payoff from a game, or parameters in the model, so this can be
thought of as a special version of Hamilton’s rule. The fact that we derived a
condition bR 2 c > 0 for the spread of altruism depends on the particular
payoff structure of the model. If there were nonadditive payoffs, we would
have derived a different condition for the spread of altruism. Section 4 (and
the appendix) illustrated how these general versions of Hamilton’s rule de-
scribe the special versions from particular models. As mentioned in sections
3.1 and 3.3, there are also approximate versions of Hamilton’s rule that re-
quire the assumption of weak selection to calculate relatedness or in order to
split ﬁtness effects into additive components. Thus, these rules abstract
away from the particular payoff structure and so describe a wider range
of cases than special forms of the rule. The assumption of weak selection,
then, provides some restriction on the conditions under which approximate
versions of Hamilton’s rule will apply but allows us to give an approximately
correct condition for the spread of a social behavior for arbitrary payoff struc-
tures. (See Birch and Okasha [2015] for more discussion.)
Note that both general and approximate versions of Hamilton’s rule ap-
ply for arbitrary payoff structures, but neither is dynamically sufﬁcient.
They instead allow us to perform a static analysis, comparing ﬁtnesses at
speciﬁc points in the evolutionary process (usually the points of interest
are equilibria). Since this article has looked at how inclusive ﬁtness is used
in the replicator dynamics compared with approaches based on the Price
equation, it has focused on the contrast between abstract models in quanti-
tative genetics and idealized models in evolutionary game theory. However,
that the critics of inclusive ﬁtness prefer dynamic models over these static
modeling techniques is perhaps the more fundamental disagreement in the
debate.
There is the additional issue of interpreting the R parameter in Hamil-
ton’s rule. Although many inclusive ﬁtness theorists recognize that R in in-
clusive ﬁtness calculations can be thought of as a general measure of cor-
relation, Hamilton’s rule is still usually presented as a condition for the
evolution of a trait by kin selection. However, this is an additional oppor-
tunity for Hamilton’s rule to be misleading; a suggested biological or causal
interpretation of the parameter might be unwarranted. Some criticisms seem
to assume that Hamilton’s rule is only useful when R is a measure of kinship
(Nowak et al. 2010). The thought behind these sort of critiques of Hamil-
ton’s rule seems to be that when R does not have an intuitive biological in-
terpretation, it is not clear what explanatory power is gained from forcingThis content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on May 31, 2018 00:28:26 AM
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All uterms into this particular inequality. The power of Hamilton’s rule then
comes from using something like the statistical deﬁnitions of relatedness
provided here and estimating relatedness using measures of kinship, like
pedigrees.19
Since the statistical deﬁnitions of relatedness are historically explained
and used as measures of kinship, adopting Hamilton’s rule as a starting point
might seem to suggest an interpretation in terms of kin selection and may lead
to theorists ignoring other mechanisms that generate assortment between
types. Connecting the statistical and probabilistic deﬁnitions here is one
way of emphasizing how the association between ‘relatedness’ and R is con-
tingent: R just measures differences in conditional probabilities of interacting
with certain types in the population. In this context, Hamilton’s rule might be
thought of as a convenient mathematical description of the fact that there
must be sufﬁcient assortment between types in order for a trait such as altru-
ism to evolve, a general point that has been made without the use of Ham-
ilton’s rule (see, e.g., Skyrms 1996). A fully speciﬁed (but idealized) model,
like the one in section 4.2, can connect R in Hamilton’s rule to kinship, giving
it a meaningful biological interpretation.
This is in line with one suggestion to avoid wrongly interpreting results
in terms of kin selection, advanced by Taylor and Frank (1996) and Frank
(2013), among others: formulate and analyze a model ﬁrst, then afterward
use Hamilton’s rule to give an intuitive explanation of the results if appro-
priate. This allows us to set up the model with whatever mechanism of as-
sortment we think is plausible, then use Hamilton’s rule if it helps illumi-
nate important aspects of the causal structure.
6. Conclusion. While there can be beneﬁts to using inclusive ﬁtness, this
does not mean that it is always beneﬁcial to do so. Whether inclusive ﬁtness
or Hamilton’s rule should be used depends on the model or the population
one is studying. Many of the issues involved in deciding whether to use these
methods were not addressed here. This article has discussed the use of inclu-
sive ﬁtness in a special type of evolutionary model, in which pairwise interac-
tions, additive ﬁtness effects, and a ﬁnite number of types were assumed. In
doing so, this article focused the discussion on issues surrounding the differ-
ent methodologies favored by the critics and proponents of inclusive ﬁtness
theory, in absence of conceptual and mathematical complexities that can
arise in more complicated scenarios. Looking at this simple case helped to
illuminate several features of the mathematical framework of inclusive ﬁt-
ness and the debate surrounding it.19. There are of course, other issues with applications of Hamilton’s rule aside from in-
terpreting R in terms of kinship. Often in more biologically realistic models, in order to
keep R deﬁned in a way that is plausibly connected to relatedness, b and c become func-
tions of R itself. These sorts of issues are dealt with by Frank (2013) and Birch and
Okasha (2015), among others.
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DEBATE OVER INCLUSIVE FITNESS 25While there may be difﬁculties with partitioning ﬁtness effects into the
form demanded by inclusive ﬁtness when interactions become more com-
plicated, we have seen that the speciﬁc causal partition used in inclusive ﬁt-
ness does not prevent one from building dynamically sufﬁcient models, nor
does it require weak selection. Criticisms of inclusive ﬁtness claiming that it
requires these stringent assumptions are best thought of as criticisms of the
types of quantitative methods generally used by inclusive ﬁtness theorists.
One can use inclusive ﬁtness calculations in the sort of population genetic
or evolutionary game theoretic models favored by these critics. In these
models much of the advantage of using inclusive ﬁtness, such as providing
terms that can be easy to estimate empirically, disappears, but its power as
an intuitive explanation of the evolution of social traits remains.Appendix A
Equivalence with Neighbor-Modulated Fitness
The Price Equation Describes the Replicator Dynamics. Following the
deﬁnition provided in section 2.1, we can calculate the neighbor-modulated
ﬁtness of a pairwise interaction as follows:
fi 5 sii 1 s2ii: (A1)
Keeping track of probabilities of receiving payoffs was necessary in section
4.1 in order to show the connection between neighbor-modulated ﬁtness
and inclusive ﬁtness, but since we are only dealing with neighbor-modulated
ﬁtness we can use this less complicated expression. In these calculations, we
will track the change in g, genetic value.
By deﬁnition, _E(g) 5 oigi _xi 1 oi _gixi. As mentioned, for simplicity we
assume that there is no transmission bias and set oi _gixi 5 0. Then, since
the replicator dynamics provides us an equation for _xi, we can plug the
replicator dynamics into the Price equation:

















noj sjj 1oi gixis2ii 2oi gixi
1
noj s2jj
5 E siigð Þ 2 E siið ÞE gð Þ 1 E s2iigð Þ 2 E s2iið ÞE gð Þ
5 Cov sii, gð Þ 1 Cov s2ii, gð Þ:
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All uThis is the Price equation with ﬁtness partitioned into two components, the
effect the focal organism has on its own ﬁtness and the effect the social part-
ner has on the focal organism’s ﬁtness. Theorists often derive this from the
original Price equation in order to use neighbor-modulated ﬁtness calcula-
tions and introduce relatedness calculations (see, e.g., Queller 1992).
Hamilton’s rule can easily be derived from this equation. Since the way
an organism affects the ﬁtness of itself and others is (to a certain degree)
predicted by its phenotype, we can write both ﬁtness terms as the following
regressions:
sii 5 asiip 1 bsiip p 1 εsiip; (A3)
s2ii 5 as2iip0 1 bs2iip0 p
0 1 εs2iip0 : (A4)
Since the a’s are the intercepts of the regression, they are constants and can-
not covary with g. The ε’s are error terms, which do not covary with g when
payoffs are additive (Queller 1992). So, plugging (A3) and (A4) into the
last line of (A2), we are left with
_E gð Þ 5 bsiipCov p, gð Þ 1 bs2iip0Cov p0, gð Þ: (A5)
When we can interpret bsiip as a cost c and bs2iip0 as a beneﬁt b, this gives us
_E(g) > 0 when b  Cov p
0, gð Þ
Cov p, gð Þ 2 c > 0, (A6)
where Cov( p0, g)=Cov( p, g) is the neighbor-modulated ﬁtness version of
relatedness.The Replicator Dynamics Describes the Price Equation.When there are
a ﬁnite number of types, gi can be written as an indicator function:
g<i>j 5




For Page and Nowak (2002), who were considering phenotypes rather than
genotypes, assuming a ﬁnite number of types was a restriction. Here, in
considering genotypes, it is a natural assumption to make.
We can then use this indicator function in the Price equation with two
ﬁtness components derived above and simplify:This content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on May 31, 2018 00:28:26 AM
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DEBATE OVER INCLUSIVE FITNESS 27_E gð Þ 5 Cov sii, g<i>ð Þ 1 Cov s2ii, g<i>ð Þ
5 E siig














5 xisii 2 xi
1
noj sjj 1 xis2ii 2 xi
1
noj s2jj
5 xi fi xð Þ 2 f½ :
(A7)
Since g<i>j 5 1 when i 5 j and 0 otherwise, ojg<i>j xj 5 xi, and this simpli-
ﬁes to yield the replicator dynamics.Appendix B
Equivalence with Inclusive Fitness
The Price Equation Describes the Replicator Dynamics. This is done in
the same way as appendix A, except we take into account that the genetic
value of the focal organism times its relatedness to its social partner is a
measure of the social partner’s genetic value:
_E gð Þ 5 o
i














noj sjj 1oi giri2ixisi2i 2oi giri2ixi
1
noj sj2j
5 Cov sii, gð Þ 1 Cov si2i, g0ð Þ:
(B1)
This is again a version of the Price equation where the ﬁtness effect is split
into two components. Here, though, ﬁtness is split into the effect the focal
organism has on its own ﬁtness and the effect the focal organism has on its
social partner’s ﬁtness.
In order to relate this to Hamilton’s rule, we can again notice that the ﬁt-
ness components are predicted by phenotype. Since in this case the focal
organism causes the ﬁtness effects, both for itself and its social partner,
the phenotype of the focal organism predicts both ﬁtness effects. So, we
use the phenotype of the focal organism in both regressions:This content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on May 31, 2018 00:28:26 AM
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All usii 5 asiip 1 bsiip p 1 εsiip; (B2)
s2ii 5 asi2ip 1 bsi2ip p 1 εsi2ip: (B3)
We can then plug (B2) and (B3) into the last line of (B1) and rearrange to
obtain the inclusive ﬁtness version of Hamilton’s rule:
_E(g) > 0 when b  Cov p, g
0ð Þ
Cov p, gð Þ 2 c > 0: (B4)
The Replicator Dynamics Describes the Price Equation. We can again
let gi be an indicator function and write














5 xisii 2 xi
1
noj sjj 1 xiri2isi2i 2 xiri2i
1
noj sj2j
5 xi fi xð Þ 2 f½ :
(B5)
Again, this simpliﬁes to yield the replicator dynamics.REFERENCES
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